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While recent labor adjustment 
has been more pronounced 
than on average over the 
past 40 years, it has been 
pretty typical of the average 
response during recessions 
over this period.
Common labor market measures paint a 
decidedly gloomy picture of current 
conditions for U.S. workers. Some of 
these measures, such as payroll employ-
ment and the civilian unemployment 
rate, have declined more during the 
ﬁ  rst 17 months of the current recession, 
which began in December 2007, than in 
any similar period after World War II. 
Firms appear to be aggressively adjusting 
their work force given the sharp drop 
in economic activity. As a result, pro-
ductivity growth has remained steady 
throughout the downturn so far.
During past periods of very low economic 
activity, in particular the recessions of the 
mid-1970s and early 1980s, labor produc-
tivity declined with output, suggesting 
that ﬁ  rms retained more employees than 
their short-term business needs might 
have warranted. This can arise when 
ﬁ  rms decide it would be too difﬁ  cult to 
replace some of their workers when 
business picks up because of the highly 
valued skills they possess. It also explains 
why employment declines typically lag 
economic activity. Instead of letting these 
workers go, ﬁ  rms will aggressively cut 
work hours to lower their labor costs in 
line with the decline in their revenues—
a process that is sometimes referred to 
as “labor hoarding.”1 
In this Chicago Fed Letter, we examine how 
typical the speed and mix of labor adjust-
ment have been during this downturn. 
We use statistical relationships between 
economic activity and labor market per-
formance over the past 40 years, and 
exclusively from past recessions during 
this period, to predict what we would 
have expected to see across a variety of 
labor market measures during this reces-
sion; then we compare our predictions 
with the actual outcomes. This allows us 
to answer the question of whether ﬁ  rms 
are adjusting their work force more 
quickly in this recession than they have 
in the past and whether the methods 
they are using to do so differ from those 
used in the past.
We ﬁ  nd that recent labor adjustment 
has been more pronounced than the 
average over the past 40 years. However, 
this adjustment resembles very closely 
what we would expect given the average 
experiences of past recessions. Work 
force adjustment has been particularly 
rapid in industries at the heart of the 
current downturn, such as construction, 
ﬁ  nancial activities, and leisure and hos-
pitality, and more typical of the average 
recession for industries such trade, 
transportation, and utilities and manu-
facturing. Low-skill workers have been 
particularly hard hit by this recession, 
while high-skill workers have also not 
escaped unscathed. Our results are not 
typical of labor hoarding, although we 
do ﬁ  nd some tentative evidence that 
ﬁ  rms are possibly trying to retain their 
most highly skilled workers through 
lower pay and longer hours.How do we measure labor adjustment?
To evaluate the pace of work force ad-
justment, we estimate regressions that 
associate four key labor market mea-
sures—total nonfarm payroll employ-
ment, the civilian unemployment rate,  
the workweek (or average weekly hours), 
and labor productivity—with their own 
past values, as well as the past and con-
temporaneous values of real gross do-
mestic product (GDP).2 
We estimate the models on two quarterly 
samples, with both encompassing data 
from 1967:Q1 through 2007:Q2. In one 
case, we include all quarters in the re-
gressions (full sample), but in the second 
case we only include quarters when the 
economy is in a recession (recession sam-
ple) as deﬁ  ned by the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER). The 
ﬁ  rst sample gives us an idea of how ﬁ  rms 
have adjusted their work force on aver-
age over the past 40 years given changes 
in economic activity. The latter sample 
accounts for the possibility that ﬁ  rms may 
behave differently during recessions than 
during times when activity is expanding.3 
With the estimates from these regres-
sions, we arrive at predictions for each 
labor market measure, using the path of 
real GDP growth from 2007:Q3 through 
2009:Q1. This allows us to compare the 
actual behavior of the labor market 
against what historical patterns would 
have predicted. Then, we repeat this ex-
ercise with data broken down by industry 
and education level so that we can also 
evaluate the adjustment mix. 
Overall ﬁ  ndings
Figure 1 plots the actual and predicted 
values for the four labor market measures. 
We ﬁ  nd that measures of 
employment have looked 
signiﬁ  cantly worse during 
this recession (blue lines) 
than our full sample sta-
tistical models (gray lines) 
predict. Speciﬁ  cally, rough-
ly 1.5% (or 2 million) more 
jobs have been lost (pan-
el A), and the unemploy-
ment rate (panel B) has 
increased by nearly 27% 
more than the forecast 
(8.1% vs. 6.4%). This is 
not being offset by unusual 
changes in the workweek 
(panel C). In fact, the de-
cline in the workweek has 
been nearly completely 
anticipated by the model. 
With labor market activity 
declining faster than ex-
pected, productivity has 
been higher than predict-
ed (panel D).
However, if we measure 
the pace of labor adjust-
ment based solely on his-
torical patterns during 
NBER recession periods 
(i.e., the black lines), we 
ﬁ  nd that employment and 
unemployment have fallen 
almost exactly in line with 
what the simple statistical 
models predict. The similarity of the 
timing and depth of employment losses 
are particularly striking. Furthermore, 
the workweek, if anything, looks to be 
holding up more strongly than experi-
ence in past recessions would suggest. 
Therefore, while labor adjustment has 
been more pronounced than on average 
over the past 40 years, it has been pretty 
typical of the average response during 
recessions over this period. 
Findings by industry and 
education level
Figure 2 displays our results by industry 
and education level for both the full 
period and recession samples.4 Due to 
space constraints, we report only the 
cumulative difference between actual 
and predicted labor market outcomes 
through 2009:Q1. A negative number 
  1. Out-of-sample forecasts of labor market variables
NOTES: All variables have been indexed to 100 in 2007:Q2. The workweek measure includes only production and nonsupervisory workers, which 
cover about 80% of employees. Productivity covers the nonfarm businesses sector.
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, payroll survey; U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey; 
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indicates that ﬁ  rms are cutting jobs, 
the workweek, or wages faster than the 
statistical model predicts.
The full sample results by industry 
indicate broad-based labor market con-
tractions above and beyond those expect-
ed by the statistical models, particularly 
in construction, professional and busi-
ness services, and leisure and hospitality. 
Changes in the workweek have been 
more uneven, however, with work hours 
declining fastest in construction, man-
ufacturing, and leisure and hospitality. 
Notably, the labor indicators in the in-
formation services industry have held 
up relatively well. 
In comparison to the full sample results, 
the recession sample results are muted. 
Nevertheless, the construction, ﬁ  nancial 
activities, and leisure and hospitality 
industries still appear to have adjusted 
much more quickly to this downturn 
than to those in the past. Much of this 
reﬂ  ects the nature of this recession, with 
the decline in residential housing hap-
pening early on, followed by the credit 
crisis and the fall in consumer demand. 
Labor market performance in other in-
dustries has looked fairly typical for a 
recession of this size. That said, work 
force adjustment continues and is not 
fully reﬂ  ected in the data through 
2009:Q1. For instance, some more recent 
anecdotal evidence has noted further 
efforts to reduce hours in order to avoid 
additional layoffs in manufacturing.5 
Consistent with our aggregate produc-
tivity results, real wages have been high-
er than predicted with two exceptions. 
The ﬁ  rst exception is the leisure and 
hospitality industry in the full sample. 
If this were indeed an indicator of la-
bor hoarding, it should be accompa-
nied by a faster decline in hours and a 
slower decline in employment. This is 
the case for the workweek, but not so 
for employment. The second exception 
is the ﬁ  nancial activities industry based 
on the recession sample. However, 
here too the behavior of hours and 
employment are not commensurate 
with labor hoarding.
We also repeated the analysis by worker 
education level, using the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Current Population Survey, often 
referred to as the household survey.6 
Across education groups, we still ﬁ  nd 
larger declines in employment for the 
full sample. In terms of the workweek, 
our results demonstrate an interesting 
dichotomy between those who have 
completed college and those who have 
not, with slower declines in the workweek 
for the latter and faster for the former 
during the current recession. The most 
signiﬁ  cant declines in the workweek have 
been felt by high school dropouts, who 
also happen to be one of the groups ex-
periencing the highest rates of job loss. 
For the recession sample, a pattern 
emerges with employment declines gen-
erally decreasing by education level. In 
particular, while employers are shrinking 
the highly educated part of their work 
force at a faster pace than is typical, it 
is at a slower pace than for other educa-
tion groups. Moreover, the average 
workweek of college graduates has been 
relatively well maintained, albeit perhaps 
for less pay among those with a post-
graduate education. This latter fact may 
indicate some effort by ﬁ  rms to contain 
labor costs and yet retain their most 
highly skilled workers through lower 
pay and longer hours. 
Conclusion
Labor adjustment during the current 
recession has been well predicted by the 
typical experiences of previous reces-
sions. However, unlike the downturns 
of the mid-1970s and early 1980s, pro-
ductivity growth has remained positive, 
suggesting little evidence of widespread 
labor hoarding. Firms in industries at 
  2. Cumulative difference between actual and predicted labor market performance
  Employment growth  Workweek  Real wage growth
  (percent)  (change in hours)  (percent)
 
Sample period Full  Recession  Full  Recession  Full  Recession
By industry       
Goods-producing industries  –13.1  –1.2  –0.6  –0.1  5.0  9.2
 Construction  –25.2  –19.5  –1.3  –1.1  7.4  7.7
 Manufacturing  –9.0  2.2  –0.7  0.0  5.4  10.1   
Service-providing  industries  –6.0 –3.6  0.0 0.4  7.6 9.1
  Trade, transportation, and utilities  –8.4  –2.3  0.0  0.1  6.7  9.5
 Information  0.0  4.3  1.1  1.1  7.8  11.3
 Financial  activities  –8.2  –9.3  0.4  0.5  2.0  –1.0
  Professional and business services  –14.4  –5.5  0.2  0.5  14.1  17.9
  Leisure and hospitality  –13.1  –9.3  –0.3  0.1  –1.3  4.7
              
By education level            
  High school dropouts  –16.4  –16.5  –0.4  –0.3  6.6  –
  High school graduates, no college  –7.5  –11.4  –0.2  1.0  –6.1  –
 Some  college  –13.7  –14.3  –0.2  0.5  4.7  –
 College  graduates  –25.7  –9.2  0.8  0.8  8.1  –
 Postgraduate  education  –5.3  –7.6  0.7  1.7  –4.0  –
       
NOTES: Calculated for the period 2007:Q3–2009:Q1. A negative number indicates that ﬁ  rms are cutting jobs, the workweek, or 
wages faster than the statistical model predicts. The employment and workweek models by education level are estimated on 
data back to 1976. The wage model by education level is estimated on data back to 1982; we do not report recession sample 
estimates for this model because of the small sample size. Education levels prior to 1992 are based on years of completed 
schooling. Self-employed workers are excluded from the sample, and the workweek is calculated on the basis of all jobs held. 
In addition, all Current Population Survey data were seasonally adjusted using the U.S. Census Bureau’s X12 procedure. 
SOURCES: Authors’ calculations based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, payroll survey; and U.S. Census Bureau, Current 
Population Survey.the heart of the current downturn have 
aggressively reduced payrolls and work 
hours, while others have been less quick 
to do so in comparison with previous 
recessions. Low-skill workers have been 
particularly hard hit by this recession, 
while high-skill workers have also not 
escaped unscathed. 
1  Some recent anecdotes support this 
“labor hoarding” story. See, e.g., Brian 
Blackstone, 2009, “Productivity trend 
weighing on jobs,” Wall Street Journal, 
March 6, and Cari Tuna, 2009, “Weighing 
furlough vs. layoff,” Wall Street Journal, 
April 13, p. B6.
2  The number of past values is chosen 
individually for each labor market mea-
sure and real GDP based on minimization 
of the Bayesian information criterion, 
but it is capped at four lags. We ﬁ  rst-
differenced the unemployment rate and 
the workweek and log ﬁ  rst-differenced 
real GDP, productivity, and payroll employ-
ment to induce stationarity in each time 
series. These transformations were tested 
using augmented Dickey-Fuller tests 
and matched many of the transforma-
tions used in the construction of the 
Chicago Fed National Activity Index 
(www.chicagofed.org/cfnai). 
3  There is a long tradition of empirically 
treating the business cycle in an asymmetric 
fashion. For one prominent example, 
see J. D. Hamilton, 1989, “A new approach 
to the economic analysis of nonstation-
ary time series and the business cycle,” 
Econometrica, Vol. 57, No. 2, March, 
pp. 357–384.
4  Figure 2 omits some industries that either 
have not witnessed employment declines 
during the current recession or form a 
small portion of their respective sectors. We 
focus on real wages given a lack of avail-
able detailed industry productivity data. 
All wage variables were deﬂ  ated by the 
total Personal Consumption Expenditures 
Price Index and log ﬁ  rst-differenced to 
obtain stationary time series.
5  See the Seventh Federal Reserve District’s 
April Beige Book report, available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/beigebook/ 
2009/default.htm, and Timothy Aeppel 
and Justin Lahart, 2009, “Lean factories 
ﬁ  nd it hard to cut jobs even in a slump,” 
Wall Street Journal, March 9, p. A1.
6  Because of the different data sets and dif-
ferent time periods, the average response 
by education group will not match the 
average response by industry group.